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H. Patrick Wells*

A Leap of Faith: TWAIL Meets Caribbean
Queer Rights Jurisprudence—Intersections
with International Human Rights Law

This article examines the legal status of queer rights in Caribbean jurisprudence.
It conducts an analysis of Caribbean queer rights case law, in order to arrive at
an understanding of the extent and dynamics of constitutional protection for these
rights. It then uses the revelations from this analysis to determine how Caribbean
queer rights jurisprudence has intersected with international human rights norms,
values and rules. Finally, the article applies the TWAIL methodological approach
to international law to argue that the Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence has not
so far reflected the counter-hegemonic, resistance, anti-imperialist discourse that
TWAIL champions, in spite of the socio-cultural and political Caribbean realities of
homophobia. This homophobia mirrors some of the key conceptual notions and
impulses of the TWAIL critique of international human rights law. I further argue that
TWAIL, in spite of a number of its concerns about some of the norms and values
found in international human rights law, including those related to gay rights, can
nevertheless accommodate equality-seeking queer rights/human rights, if the core
assumption is that queer rights ultimately are about the rule of law and democracy.
I conclude that even though Caribbean courts are at an infancy in their reach to
protect queer rights on the premise of international human rights norms, they have
nevertheless certainly taken a leap of faith on an equality-preserving trajectory.
Dans le présent article, nous examinons le statut juridique des droits des
personnes gaies dans la jurisprudence des pays des Caraïbes. Nous analysons
cette jurisprudence afin de comprendre l’étendue et la dynamique de la protection
constitutionnelle de ces droits dans ces pays. Nous utilisons ensuite les données
tirées de cette analyse pour examiner les rapports entre cette jurisprudence et
les normes, valeurs et règles internationales en matière de droits de la personne.
Enfin, nous appliquons l’approche méthodologique utilisée par le mouvement
TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) pour soutenir que la
jurisprudence relative aux droits des personnes gaies dans les pays des Caraïbes
n’a pas jusqu’ici tenu compte du discours anti-hégémonique et anti-impérialiste
que le mouvement TWAIL défend, malgré les réalités socioculturelles et politiques
de l’homophobie qui existe dans les Caraïbes. Cette homophobie reflète certaines
des principales notions au cœur de la critique du droit international en matière de
droits de l’homme effectuée par TWAIL. Je soutiens en outre que TWAIL, malgré
plusieurs de ses préoccupations au sujet de certaines normes et valeurs du droit
international en matière de droits de la personne, y compris celles liées aux droits
des personnes gaies, peut néanmoins accommoder les droits de ces personnes
qui revendiquent l’égalité, si l’hypothèse de base est que leurs droits reviennent en
fin de compte à une question de primauté du droit et de démocratie. Je conclus que
même si les tribunaux dans les pays des Caraïbes n’en sont qu’à leurs premiers
pas dans la protection des droits des personnes gaies sur la base des normes
internationales des droits de la personne, ils ont néanmoins fait un acte de foi en
faveur de la préservation de l’égalité.
*
BA, MSc (Pol Sci), MSc (Soc), LLB, LLM., Attorney-at-law, Ontario, Canada. My deepest
gratitude to Professor Elizabeth F Judge, for all her assistance.
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Introduction
This article is about queer rights jurisprudence in the context of the
Caribbean polity. This area of the law in the Caribbean is at an infancy
stage. In this article, I have three key objectives. My first objective
is to conduct an analysis of the small body of Caribbean queer rights
jurisprudence in order to arrive at an understanding of the extent of
constitutional protection that has fermented for these rights in the region.
My second objective is to assess the degree to which the protections for
queer rights found in the jurisprudence reflect international human rights
law norms and values. My third is to frame an argument that, despite a
strong social and cultural opposition in the Caribbean to what are described
as Eurocentric international queer rights norms, values and legal principles
embodied in international human rights law, courts in the Caribbean have
been taking a tentative leap of faith into that world, demonstrating a
degree of willingness to embrace such norms and values. The courts have
been gently repudiating typical Caribbean/Third World objections and
opposition to “normalizing” those international norms and values, which
is a scepticism shared by the Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL) narrative.
This article makes four contributions: (i) it formulates and articulates
a narrative and an understanding of how Caribbean courts think about
matters of queer rights’ protection in the context of regional/domestic
socio-cultural norms; (ii) it explores the intersection of Caribbean
queer rights jurisprudence with international human rights law; (iii) it
interrogates the neo-colonial, counter-hegemonic narrative about queer
rights that is typical in Caribbean society and which is a partial reflection
of the skepticism towards international human rights law found broadly
in TWAIL; and (iv) it explores the potential for finding common ground
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between the Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence and TWAIL, on the
basis of shared ideologies grounded in the rule of law and democracy.
Following this Introduction, Part I sets out an overview of the
approaches to queer rights in Caribbean societies. Generally, there is a
strong cultural resistance to the flourishing of queer rights in the region.
In many instances, this resistance is visceral, leading on several occasions
to the use of violence against persons who openly present in ways that are
alleged or perceived to be queer by the public at large. This attitude projects
a kind of refutation of what is deemed to be a normalization of queer rights.
Typically, the antipathy that is demonstrated is contextualized in cultural
or religious terms and is aimed at articulating what is considered to be a
rejection of “illegitimate” international trends on sexual “permissiveness.”
Part II of the article briefly explains and discusses the methodological
framework of TWAIL. This Part highlights the ethical and intellectual
struggles engaged by TWAIL scholars, in exposing and reforming those
parts of international law that are said to reinforce inequality, unfairness
and unjustness in the global order. As a methodological approach, TWAIL
points to the “heaven/hell binary” that it claims stands in the way of the
cross-fertilization of ideas and perspectives in international law generally,
and in international human rights law in particular. This binary, according
to TWAIL, casts the First World as “heaven” and the Third World as “hell,”
relative to the protection of norms and values that epitomize a respect for
human rights. This results in a kind of dynamic where the “Western gaze”
on the so-called human rights records of Third World states stigmatizes
rather than respects. This, ultimately, in the view of TWAILers, challenges
the legitimacy of the statehood and governance of these Third World
states without giving due regard to the full cycle of historical exploitation
and abuse that produced and feeds these cycles of alleged human rights
violations, thereby “elitizing” international law.
Part III analyzes the current body of Caribbean queer rights
jurisprudence. The cases presented are from the Caribbean Court of Justice
(a regional court), and from the high (superior) and appellate courts in
individual territories: Trinidad and Tobago, Bermuda, and Belize. The
core subject matters arising in these cases are sexual intimacy in the form
of “buggery,” same-sex marriage, immigration and cross-dressing. While
these headings do not cover the widest gambit of all potential litigation
that could arise on queer rights in the region, the trajectory of litigating
queer rights in the Caribbean is at an early stage, and there is the potential
for far greater litigation.
Part IV argues that Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence, for the
most part, reflects a trend towards accepting international human rights
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law norms and values. This trend is demonstrated in the repeated reliance
on principles and opinions from international human rights tribunals
or decision-making bodies, as well as from domestic courts in other
jurisdictions such as Canada, India, and South Africa. The decisions
examined in this Part of the article also reflect a trend to associate
Caribbean constitutional and human rights provisions with the wider
norms of international human rights protection, by making linkages and
highlighting similarities and equivalences in international human rights
instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In this way the courts
appear to be locating their vindication of queer rights in the wider spectrum
of international human rights law, rather than in cloistered, cultural, and
localized expectations and norms. This section of the article also argues
that Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence appears to disempower the hard
core notions of counter-hegemony and resistance to neo-colonial human
rights norms found in TWAIL scholarship, in favour of finding a more
nuanced “made in the Caribbean” implementation of international human
rights norms. Further, the section assesses whether queer rights equalityseeking interests in the Caribbean can be accommodated within the TWAIL
regime of ideas at all. The view this article takes, in this regard, is that an
accommodation is possible, considering that in seeking to protect queer
rights, the core goals of the courts are the upholding of the rule of law
and the protection of democratic values. This is certainly not unlike what
Third World states, as a whole, seek as well. The protection of queer rights
should, therefore, be viewed not through the prism of cultural invasion and
Western penetration, but instead through the prism of such considerations
as equality before the law, respect for personal autonomy and human
dignity, and respect for free agency and expression—considerations that
coherently preserve the rule of law and democracy. Part V offers a brief
conclusion.
Ultimately, what this article aims to show is that instead of a blanket
rejection or unqualified embrace of international human rights norms,
values and laws on queer rights, or an outright rejection of the sociocultural realities of homophobia in the Caribbean region, the courts are
engaged in a slow, delicate manoeuvre, aimed at persuading reasonable
minds, through clinical reasoning and the assertion of a kind of judicial
authority of “rightness” and fairness that they hope will resonate. In other
words, the courts are not appearing to judge Caribbean norms and values,
which in their view are counter-intuitive to wider norms of respect for and
preservation of human dignity, but are instead engaging in a process that
I would call legalistic “proclaiming and rationalizing,” hoping that their
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judicial proclamations and rationalizations gradually receive institutional,
political and social approbation.
As this article shows, Caribbean courts are thoroughly open to
applying settled legal human rights principles to queer human rights, not
only from the regional diaspora but also from the proverbial “imperialist,”
“neo-colonialist” sphere. On repeated occasions, judgments from Canada,
Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) are considered favourably and are used as critical guides
to the resolutions arrived at in the local cases. There is also an evident
reliance on international human rights instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
I. Approaches to queer rights in Caribbean societies
Although things have been lethargically changing within the last few
years, historically, there has been a visceral opposition to the advancement
of queer rights in the broad socio-cultural dynamic of Caribbean societies.
According to Holness, “the Caribbean’s apprehension to Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex (LGBTI) rights advocacy is deeply rooted
in the region’s tragically oppressive colonial experience.”1 As such, many
persons in the Caribbean view the “attempt by the West toward more
tolerance for the gay community as post-colonial imperialism,”2 a view
consistent with Massad’s that the global “same-sex” rights movement
is a neo-colonial/Western enterprise.3 In a 2013 article dealing with the
promulgation of the Cayman Islands Constitution in 2009, Vlcek captures
poignantly the broad strokes of Caribbean animus to queer rights. He
claimed that the citizens in that Caribbean territory viewed the Bill of
Rights in the proposed Constitution at the time as “a form of subterfuge
intended to force this ostensibly global norm for sexual preference on
them”4 by the government of the United Kingdom (the Cayman Islands
1.
Toni Holness, “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Rights in the Caribbean: Using
Regional Bodies to Advance Culturally Charged Rights” (2013) 38:3 Brook J Intl L 925 at 926.
(Holness notes that for his article, “The acronym LGBTI is used…to include other variations of the
acronym, such as, LGBTQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, Queer/Questioning), and other sexual
minorities.” In this article, I adopt a similar position, but will use “gay rights” and “queer rights”
interchangeably as well to reference all sexual minorities as a whole).
2.
Charlene L Smith & Ryan Kosobucki, “Homophobia in the Caribbean” (2011) 1 J L & Soc
Deviance 1 at 32.
3.
Joseph Massad, “Re-orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World” (2002) 14:2
Public Culture 361.
4.
William Vlcek, “Crafting Human Rights in a Constitution: Gay Rights in the Cayman Islands
and the Limits to Global Norm Diffusion” (2013) 2:3 Global Constitutionalism 345 at 346.
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being a British Overseas Territory). Vlcek describes this “subterfuge” as
the introduction of a norm, not through ‘socialization, institutionalization,
and demonstration,” as the means of incorporating queer rights, but
rather through a process of “norm cascade” or direct imposition through
“dominant mechanisms,”5 representing a forced transfer of “modern”
norms as a potential example of “imperialist/neo-colonial modernization.”6
Vleck’s narrative reflects the core underpinnings of the approach
taken by international human rights cultural imperialism scholars such
as Mutua, who writes of the “damning metaphor” of “Savages-VictimsSaviors,” which, he argues, fuels the current human rights paradigm.7
Mutua argues that human rights rhetoric encamps governments into either
the good or the “evil” state, with the “evil” state, typically Third World in
definition, being deemed by the good state to be one that expresses itself
“through an illiberal, anti-democratic, or other authoritarian culture” that
works as the “operational instrument of savagery” when deviation from
Western cultural expectations occurs.8 Mutua elaborates in this way:
The simple, yet complex promise of the savior is freedom: freedom
from the tyrannies of the state, tradition, and culture. But it is also the
freedom to create a better society based on particular values. In the
human rights story, the savior is the human rights corpus itself, with the
United Nations, Western governments, INGOs, and Western charities as
the actual rescuers, redeemers of a benighted world. In reality, however,
these institutions are merely fronts. The savior is ultimately a set of
culturally based norms and practices that inhere in liberal thought and
philosophy.9

Mutua’s approach is, therefore, a scholarly representation of the views
of wide sectors of Caribbean societies, which criticize international human
rights movements as characteristically Eurocentric. Those in Caribbean
societies that hold this view largely also reflect the position taken by
Mutua that these “Eurocentric” international human rights movements
are seeking to shame other cultures as being the “savage” that is inferior
and which is operating extra-normatively of Western cultural norms. This
theoretical framework has been adopted in other parts of the literature by
scholars such as McKinley, who, in relation to asylum claims, for example,
asserts that the international human rights paradigm demonstrates “the
5.
Ibid at 347.
6.
Ibid at 368.
7.
Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 Harv
Intl LJ 201 at 214-217 [Mutua, “Metaphor”].
8.
Ibid at 203.
9.
Ibid at 204.
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paradigmatic example of post-colonial rescue and the contemporary
extension of the maternal imperialist project.”10
This embroidery of views on the culturally imperialistic essence of
international human rights law, particularly in relation to queer rights, in
large measure contextualizes why homophobia in the Caribbean region11
has sometimes been a part of not only the legal politic, but also of the
expressive culture, such as in music.12 This homophobia has also been
commonly characterized by virulent incidents of public resentment, and has
often been articulated through collective violence against queer persons.13
The murder of 16 year-old Dwayne Jones, a cross-dressing teenager, by
a mob in July 2013 in Montego-Bay, Jamaica, is a tragic illustration of
such violence. As pointed out by Human Rights Watch at the time of this
incident relative to attitudes in the Jamaican society at the time:
If someone does not conform to gender expectations…they face
widespread verbal and physical abuse that can range from beatings
to armed attacks to murder…They are often driven from their homes
and communities. The Jamaican government has a poor record of
investigating and holding to account those who commit violence because
of the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Some individuals
have sought to justify Jones’ killing with comments in mainstream or
social media that he provoked the attack by ‘bringing his behavior into
the public.’14

Even in political circles, leadership in Jamaica has displayed a similar
resistance to the normalization of queer rights,15 and commensurately,
10. Michelle A McKinley, “Cultural Culprits” (2009) 24 Berkeley J Gender Law & Just 91 at 103.
11. See generally David McFadden, “Gays Live—and die—in fear in Jamaica” Associated Press
(20 July 2009), online: <http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-cb-jamaica-gay-bashing071909-2009jul19-story.html> [https://perma.cc/UL5G-4YJB]; Smith & Kosobucki, supra note 2;
Robert Carr, “On ‘Judgments’: Poverty, Sexuality-Based Violence and Human Rights in 21st Century
Jamaica” (2003) 2 Caribbean J Social Work 71; Tim Padgett, “The Most Homophobic Place on Earth”
(12 April 2006) Time.com, online: <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1182991,00.
html> [https://perma.cc/H7ND-7DPC]
12. Camille A Nelson, “Lyrical Assault: Dancehall versus the Cultural Imperialism of the NorthWest” (2008) 17 S Cal Interdisciplinary LJ 231.
13. See generally Human Rights Watch, “This Alien Legacy: The Origins of ‘Sodomy’ Laws in
British Colonialism” (2008), online: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/12/17/alien-legacy/originssodomy-laws-british-colonialism> [https://perma.cc/9DGW-S7S9]
14. “Jamaica: Cross-Dressing Teenager Murdered Investigate, Condemn Violence, Respect
Rights of LGBT People” Human Rights Watch (1 August 2013), online: <https://www.hrw.org/
news/2013/08/01/jamaica-cross-dressing-teenager-murdered> [https://perma.cc/HW9P-QLD3]
15. Nicholas Laughlin, “Jamaica, Caribbean: No Gays in Golding’s Government” Global Voices
(23 May 2008), online: <https://globalvoices.org/2008/05/23/jamaica-caribbean-no-gays-in-goldingsgovernment> [https://perma.cc/5BEE-WXBM]; Athaliah Reynolds-Baker, Not in my Cabinet:
Representations of Gay People in the Jamaican Print Media (MA Thesis, University of Leicester,
October 2014) [unpublished].
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where that leadership has expressed or hinted at any openness or
willingness to accommodate reasoned discussion on the matter, there is
an oppositional reaction from the general public and from other political
figures. In 2011 during the general election debate in Jamaica, when one
candidate for prime minister, Portia Simpson Miller, indicated that she
would not have a policy banning homosexuals from serving in her cabinet
were she to become the prime minister (as one former prime minister had
said he would), the energy minister at the time, Clive Mullings, warned that
“God [had] brought down fire and brimstone on Sodom and Gomorrah.”16
All of this is part of the fabric of resistance to the international
human rights approach to queer rights and largely reflects the melody
of the culturally conservative approach to these rights in the Caribbean.
As one advocate of this resistance notes, there has been a “centrality and
manipulation of sexuality and sexual rights in struggles for and against the
civilizing mission that lies at the heart of key aspects of globalization.”17 This
is essentially a questioning of the democratic legitimacy of international
human rights law.18 It is no wonder, therefore, that the creation of the
Caribbean Court of Justice, a regional court, was seen as marking “the
closing of a circle on independence” and the “sunset of British colonial
rule.”19 This contextualizes the view that because of the Caribbean’s
“shared socio-cultural characteristics,” consensus on the way forward
should emerge from regional norms rather than from external imposition
or transplantation of gay rights advocacy.20 As this paper reveals in Parts
III and IV, however, the courts in the Caribbean now do not appear to share
this view and are entirely inclined to formulate an approach to queer rights
validation that is largely and meaningfully informed by what is happening
and has happened on the wider international human rights scene. In fact,
one of the most positively transformative decisions that is examined in
this article emerged from the Caribbean Court of Justice and addressed
a subject matter that many would perhaps view as an entirely Caribbean
anathema: cross-dressing among queer men in public spaces.
16. The Economist, “Go Sista—Sodom and Mrs. Simpson Miller,” The Economist Group Limited
(London, 7 January 2012), online: <https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2012/01/07/go-sista>
[https://perma.cc/R67F-WXTT] (Mrs. Simpson-Miller was affectionately referred to by the population
as “Sista P,” an abbreviated reference to her first name, “Portia,” hence the title “Go Sista…”)
17. Katherine Franke, “Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights” (2012) 44:1
Colum HR LR 1 at 2.
18. See generally Douglas Leo Donoho, “Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making” (2003) 21 Wis Intl LJ 1.
19. See generally Leonard Birdsong, “Formation of the Caribbean Court of Justice: The Sunset of
British Colonial Rule in the English-Speaking Caribbean” (2005) 36 U Miami Inter-American L Rev
197.
20. Holness, supra note 1 at 945.
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Against the background of this framework and narrative of “cultural
resistance,” it, therefore, becomes apposite to analyse and understand the
degree to which the coalescing of international human rights norms, values
and expectations around an expanding body of rules in the international
arena has influenced the way in which queer rights protections are evolving
in the Caribbean. Before conducting this analysis, I situate the TWAIL
narrative in international human rights law, in order to provide context to
the arguments to be made in Part IV.
II. Theoretical framework—third world approaches to international law
(TWAIL)
So far in the region, the cases that have emerged on the protection of queer
rights as human rights suggest a tentative drift towards a general embrace
of international human rights trends. This portends a tension between the
TWAIL approach to international human rights norms and the overall
direction of Caribbean Courts on queer rights.
The pith and substance of the TWAIL perspective is an opposition
to what is perceived as the broadly unequal, unfair and unjust nature of
international law rules that very often, though not always, reinforce Third
World domination and subordination.21 One of the things that undoubtedly
unites TWAIL scholars is their opposition to a politics that is grounded in
the notion of the “empire” versus others.22 As described by al Attar et al:
TWAIL is an alternative narrative of international law that has developed
in opposition to the realities of domination and subordination prevalent
in the international legal apparatus. A fundamentally counter-hegemonic
movement, TWAIL is united in its rejection of what its champions regard
as an unjust relationship between the Third World and international law.23

Similarly, Eslava et al explain that:
Although there is arguably no single theoretical approach which unites
TWAIL scholars, they share both a sensibility, and a political orientation.
TWAIL is therefore ... defined by a commonality of concerns. Those
concerns centre around attempting to attune the operation of International
law to those sites and subjects that have traditionally been positioned as
the ‘others of international law.’24
21. See generally Obiora C Okafor, “Marxian Embraces (and De-Couplings) in Upendra Baxi’s
Human Rights Scholarship: A Case Study” in Susan Marks ed, International Law on the Left: ReExamining the Marxist Legacies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 252 [“Marxian”].
22. See generally BS Chimni, “The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third
World Approach” (2007) 8:2 Melbourne J Intl L 499.
23. Mohsen al Attar and Rebekah Thompson, “How the Multi-Level Democratisation of International
Law-Making Can Effect Popular Aspirations Towards Self-Determination” (2011) 3:1 Trade Law &
Development 65 at 67.
24. Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, “Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality
of International Law” (2011) 3:1 Trade Law & Development 103 at 104.
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As a result of this positioning, TWAIL scholars are “solidly united to a
shared ethical commitment to the intellectual and practical struggle to
expose, reform, or even retrench those features of the international legal
system that help to create or maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or
unjust global order…taking the lives and experiences of…[the] Third
World much more seriously than has generally been the case.”25 In this
context, the act of exposing the colonial features and structural framework
of international law is considered to be fundamental to understanding
the current international legal order.26 In this sense, TWAIL is, therefore,
almost certainly a part of the fabric of critical internationalism.27
In relation to international human rights law specifically, TWAIL
scholars have consistently articulated a series of concerns that have been
discussed in many parts of the literature. As presented by Okafor, these
include the “heaven/hell binary,” the “one-way traffic paradigm,” the
“orientation of the Western gaze,” “stigmatization of the Third World,” and
the “conceptual economy of appearances.”28 Okafor’s initial argument is
that current international human rights law operates from the dichotomous
paradigm of the “heavenly” versus the “hellish.” In this paradigm, the
West is deemed to be good, while the Third World is consistently type-cast
as bad.29 What emerges in this scenario, in Okafor’s view, is a monologue
flowing from the “West” to the rest. Instead of a dialogue that can ultimately
forge a kind of “mass cultural legitimacy” in international human rights
law, there is a dynamic of alienation. This binary, concludes Okafor, is “at
best, arrogance, and at worst, disingenuous.”30 It contributes to the tenuous
attraction of certain international human rights norms in some parts of
the Third World.31 The reality, argues Okafor, presents a certain irony, as
25. Obiora C Okafor, “Newness, Imperialism and International Legal Reform in Our Time: A
TWAIL Perspective” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 171 at 176 [Okafor, “Newness”].
26. Antony Anghie, “Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial Institutions,
and the Third World” (2000) 32 NYU J Intl L & Pol 243 at 245-246 [Anghie, “Globalization”].
27. Makau Mutua, “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings
31 at 31.
28. Obiora C Okafor, “International Human Rights Fact-Finding Praxis in its Living Forms: A TWAIL
Perspective” (2014) 1 Transnational Human Rights Review 59 at 66-67 [Okafor, “International”].
29. See generally OC Okafor & SC Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining International Human Rights Education
in Our Time: Beyond Three Constitutive Orthodoxies” (2001) 14 Leiden J Intl L 563 [Okafor &
Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining”]; Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7; Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human
Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 4 [Baxi, “Future of Human Rights”]; Upendra Baxi,
“‘A Work in Progress?’: The United States’ Report to the United Nations’ Human Rights Committee”
(1995) 35 Indian J Intl L 34 [Baxi, “Work in Progress”]; Upendra Baxi, “Random Reflections on the
[Im]possibilityof Human Rights,” online: <https://www.pdhre.org/dialogue/reflections.html> [https://
perma.cc/2CRD-3PME] [Baxi, “Random Reflections”].
30. Okafor & Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining,” ibid at 574.
31. See e.g. CA Odinkalu, “Why More Africans Don’t Use Human Rights Language” (2000) 2:1
Human Rights Dialogue 3 at 3-4.
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even in Western societies there are obvious contradictions in the extent
to which countries adhere to human rights.32 The ultimate challenge, as
Okafor sees it, is, therefore, that this binary projects an absolutism that
stands in the way of perfectly legitimate cross-fertilization of human rights
ideas and perspectives, across the North South global divide. The crux
of the critique is that this is untenable, as there exists no place that is
so “heavenly” that it repudiates any possibility of questioning, criticism,
revision or enlargement, considering that those things that are determined
to be human rights emerge from some social, political or economic force.
Scholars such as Mutua have strongly argued this perspective.33
The result, argue TWAIL scholars, is the one-way flow of what is
considered good and bad in international human rights law. This one-way
flow, says Okafor, derives “a logical end product of a conceptualization
of human rights…as a one-way traffic paradigm in which human rights
knowledge, scrutiny and supervision tends to flow from…the West, which
supposedly invented human rights…in the direction of those regions of
the world…which apparently did not invent human rights.”34 One of the
most apparent consequences of this intellectual mirage, argues Okafor, is
that it reinforces and systematizes a “racialized hierarchy in Third World
societies,” making these societies the perennial subjects of human rights
investigations, condemnations and allegations of human rights violations.
This, according to Marsh et al, flows from the fact that:
What we today call “universal human rights” are to a great extent the
product of Western societies…[These rights] emerged from a particularly
Western historical context and [were] influenced by a number of Western
contingencies, none of which are likely to be reproduced in other parts of
the world. [Nevertheless]…the…articulation of these ideas bears little or
no relation to their acceptance by other cultures.35

32. EK Quashigah & Obiora C Okafor, “Toward the Enhancement of the Relevance and Effectiveness
of the Movement for the Securement of Legitimate Governance in Africa” in EK Quashigah & OC
Okafor, eds, Legitimate Governance in Africa: International and Domestic Legal Perspectives (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999) 539 at 553. See also Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7 at 211.
33. See e.g. Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7 at 217; Makau Mutua, “The Ideology of Human
Rights” (1996) 36 Va J Intl L 589 [Mutua, “Ideology”]; Antony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria
and the Colonial Origins of International Law” (1996) 5 Social & Legal Studies 321; and
P Hountondji, “The Master’s Voice—Remarks on the Problem of Human Rights in Africa” in
UNESCO, Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights 319 at 320-332 (Paris: UNESCO, 1986).
34. Okafor, “International,” supra note 28 at 72; See also Baxi, “Future of Human Rights,” supra
note 29 at 4; Baxi, “Work in Progress,” supra note 29; Baxi, “Random Reflections,” supra note 29.
35. Christopher Marsh & Daniel P Payne, “The Globalization of Human Rights and the Socialization
of Human Rights Norms,” (2007) BYU L Rev 665 at 671.
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This, as some scholars see it, results in a situation where global human
rights juggernauts devote their human rights activism towards the Third
World,36 with very little focus on the First/Western/Northern World.37
TWAIL scholars point out that the “heaven” and “hell” binary and
the resultant one-way flow of international human rights norms causes
a consistent gaze on the Third World by the West, stigmatizing those
parts of the world as the problem spots. This gaze reinforces questioning
and challenging of the legitimacy of Third World statehood, governance
and practices.38 Because of this, whenever any action or series of actions
is identified by the West as a violation of human rights in these Third
World states, condemnation heaps upon them, as “[w]hatever the Western
eye recognizes as a violation of human rights tends to become widely
recognized as such, and whoever the Western eye sees as a pariah, as the
‘bad guy,’ tends to become widely viewed as such…”39 It is this state of
affairs that causes mainstream international human rights discourse to treat
Third World culture as retrograde to Western human rights norms, notions
and values.40 In this way, Third World culture is stigmatized as almost
always violative of human rights, as if human rights are culture-free.41
Separate and apart from this diminution of Third World cultures as part
of the fabric of the inculcation of Western/First World international human
rights norms, TWAIL scholars also argue that there is the production
of what is referred to as a “conceptual economy of appearances.” In
explaining this concept, Okafor indicates that it is where a:

36. See J Smith & R Pagnucco, “Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human
Rights NGOs in the 1990s” (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 379 at 386.
37. Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7 at 216-217.
38. See Obiora C Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State
Fragmentation in Africa, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) [Okafor, “Legitimate Statehood”];
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) [Anghie, “Imperialism”]; Makau Mutua, “The Banjul Charter and
the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of Duties” (1995) 35 Va J Intl L 339
[Mutua, “Banjul Charter”].
39. Okafor, “International,” supra note 28 at 76.
40. See C Nyanio, “How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization
of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries” (2000) 41 Harv Intl LJ 381; Mutua, “Banjul Charter,”
supra note 38; Obiora C Okafor, “Attainments, Eclipses and Disciplinary Renewal-in International
Human Rights Law: A Critical Overview” in D Armstrong, ed, Routledge Handbook of International
Law (London: Routledge, 2009) at 307 [Okafor, “Attainments”]; and A Riles, “Anthropology, Human
Rights and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage” (2004) 15 Finnish Yearbook of Intl L 9.
41. See D Bell, The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999); AA An’im, Human Rights in Cross-Cultural Perspectives: A Quest for Consensus
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995); J Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of
Human Rights” (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 281; PT Zeleza, “The Struggle for Human Rights
in Africa” in PT Zeleza & PJ McConnaughay, eds, Human Rights, The Rule of Law, and Development
in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
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person, group, or country is featured as a culprit (or human rights violator)
without necessarily fingering the full cycle of consumption, exploitation,
abuse, and so on, that fed or feed the chain of events that ultimately
produced the violation…[ignoring] the lack of in-depth knowledge
of the history and context that frame [the problem]… impos[ing] a
problematic or even harmful conceptual economy of appearances that
decontextualizes and therefore distorts…the situation…42

The way in which this impacts the international human rights discourse,
according to TWAIL scholars, is that trumpeted human rights violations
identified by the “saviours” of the West are not viewed through the prisms
of wider economic facts and histories that give cause and context to these
“violations,” but instead are denoted as failings solely of the governments
and institutions of these “violating” Third World states. In other words, this
is a wilful blindness to the antecedent conduct of hegemonic imposition
and manipulation of Third World socio-political and socio-economic
realities—impositions and manipulations that in turn give rise to some of
the very failings of the Third World states which are ultimately condemned
by these hegemonic states and actors. The “saviours” thereby ignore the
element of the “capture” by Western hegemons. As summarized by Eslava
et al., “[t]he most significant point of departure of TWAIL from what might
loosely be called ‘mainstream’ interpretations of international law, is in
TWAIL’s insistence that issues of material distribution and imbalances of
power affect the way in which international legal concepts, categories,
norms and doctrines are produced and understood.”43
It is these notions of normativity and universalism in international
human rights law that TWAIL sets out to resist,44 accordingly “de-elitizing”
international law.45 As Rajagopal points out, in spite of how much human
rights has become entangled in a discourse of “military intervention,
economic reconstruction and social transformation,” it is nevertheless
still “legitimate to use international law as an explicit counter hegemonic
tool of resistance.”46 As he sees it, there is clearly room for human rights
discourse to be influenced by “counter-hegemonic struggles across a range

42. Okafor, “International,” supra note 28 at 81.
43. Eslava & Pahuja, supra note 24 at 105.
44. John D Haskell, “TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World Approaches to
International Law” (2014) 27 Can JL & Jurisprudenc 383 at 399.
45. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements and
Third World Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 292.
46. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights
and Development as a Third World Strategy” (2006) 27:5 Third World Quarterly 767 at 770 and 772
[Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic”].
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of areas.”47 In other words, TWAILers must speak “truth to power.”48
Importantly however, it is necessary to point that:
…the argument is not necessarily that the human rights conditions in the
Third World are either ideal or even at par with the situation in Western
states. We do recognize that there is a hellish dimension to the lives of
the majority of the inhabitants of the Third World. However, we also
recognize the fact that such hellish conditions are not absolute. Third
World states are hells and heavens to varying extents, depending on
whom you ask. So are Western states.49

Conceptually, this “resistance,” anti-imperialism construct which is
characteristic of TWAIL is a useful approach to the analysis in this article,
bearing in mind the matters raised in Part I about Caribbean realities
and attitudes towards queer rights. It is this resentment towards what is
perceived as imperialist cultural and legal penetration that is articulated,
for instance, in the popular and expressive culture of some Caribbean
countries as mentioned in Part I, and which will help to determine the
extent to which this perception of the “invasion” of international human
rights law norms, in respect of the protection of queer rights, has impacted
Caribbean jurisprudence. This jurisprudence will now be examined.
III. Queer rights and human rights in Commonwealth Caribbean
jurisprudence—intersections with international human rights law
The key subjects of Caribbean queer rights jurisprudence are sexual
intimacy in the form of “buggery,” immigration, same-sex marriage, and
cross-dressing. These issues emerge from a study of six cases and concern
the fundamental human rights of privacy, free expression, freedom from
non-discrimination, equality before the law, and equal protection by the
law. What the cases show is that Caribbean courts are on a path of advancing
queer rights through their jurisprudence and that this advancement has
trended towards an acceptance and reflection of international human
rights norms, values and rules. The courts in these cases demonstrate this
bent by observing and relying on jurisprudence not only from overseas
(“First World”) jurisdictions and international courts and tribunals, but
also by exercising a conscious and deliberate embrace of international law
treaties and instruments, as part of the praxis of crafting their judgments.
Likewise, there are consistent references to and acknowledgements of
the foundational bases of several of the Constitutions of the region on
international human rights law instruments, such as the UDHR, the
47.
48.
49.

Rajagopal, “Counter-Hegemonic,” ibid at 772.
Michael Fakhri, “Questioning TWAIL’s Agenda” (2012) 14 Or Rev Intl L 1 at 11.
Okafor & Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining,” supra note 29 at 572.
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ICCPR, and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,
either in whole or in part. All of this leads to the conclusion that, based on
the evidence from the case law, the courts are breaking new ground in the
Caribbean, by relying on international human rights norms to protect, at
least to some degree, the human rights litigated by the queer applicants.
The only exception is the Tomlinson case, but as I argue below, the decision
in that case was simply wrong. In spite of this singular digression, the
evidence nevertheless demonstrates an obvious trajectory in the protection
of queer rights by Caribbean courts.
It is important to note, however, that this path that the courts are
on is not yet to be viewed as a revolutionary, “full speed ahead” “guns
blazing” march which relegates Caribbean reservations and socio-cultural
reluctances to jurisprudential oblivion. This is made clear in Orozco50 for
instance, where the Court stated that “it needs to be made pellucid that [the]
claim [stood] to be decided on the provisions of the Belize Constitution,
and in [that] regard, the court [stood] aloof from adjudicating on any moral
issue.”51
On the evidence that I will provide below, it is therefore arguable that
the courts, in determining queer rights matters in the context of wider
international human rights norms and values, are not acting consistent with
the wider negative and less than conciliatory attitudes that are prevalent in
the region on these issues. Recalling, for example, the apprehension in the
Caribbean to queer rights advocacy addressed by Holness, it appears from
the discussion below that the courts do not share such an “apprehension”
in the judicial posture that they have adopted. To the contrary, what seems
to be occurring instead is a judicial intellectualizing by the courts, which
assumes a sort of openness and willingness to consider the “newness” of
ideas and “freshness” of approaches to the phenomenon of queer rights in
the region. To a certain degree, this also represents a new dialectic where
decisions are being made not on account of the common perceptions and
expectations regarding queer persons and the features of queer existence
in the Caribbean, but rather in spite of the same. This new dispensation
projects an aura of judicial self-confidence and independence that is

50. Orozco v Attorney General, infra note 66 at para 53.
51. The court in Jones v Attorney General also made a similar point when it said, “This conclusion
is not an assessment or denial of the religious beliefs of anyone. This court is not qualified to do so.
However, this conclusion is a recognition that the beliefs of some, by definition, is not the belief of all
and, in the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, all are protected, and are entitled to be protected, under
the Constitution. As a result, this court must and will uphold the Constitution to recognize the dignity
of even one citizen whose rights and freedoms have been invalidly taken away” (infra note 52 at para
174).
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noteworthy, as it features a palpable dissonance between what the majority
of the people in the Caribbean would expect from the courts on the one
hand and where the courts appear to want to shift the queer rights/human
rights compass, on the other hand.
In the first case, Jones v Attorney General,52 the High Court of Trinidad
and Tobago dealt with the criminal offences of “buggery” and serious
indecency under sections 13 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act, respectively.
Section 13 criminalized “sexual intercourse per anum by a male person
with a male person or by a male person with a female person,”53 while
section 16 outlawed “[any] act, other than sexual intercourse...involving
the use of the genital organ for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire.”54 The claimant’s complaint was that both provisions were
“unconstitutional, illegal, null, void, invalid and...of no effect to the extent
that [they criminalized]...consensual sexual conduct between adults.”
According to Jones, the rights affected were individual liberty and security,
equality before the law, protection of the law, private and family life, and
freedom of thought and expression. He further articulated the ground of
unusual treatment or punishment, on account of the terms of imprisonment
related to both offences.55
The Court agreed with the claimant that both provisions were
violations of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution and it modified the
subject provisions. The Court held that the impugned provisions infringed
upon or were likely to contravene the claimant’s fundamental rights.56 The
main focus for the Court was the right to privacy, of which, it reasoned,
sexual orientation was an important aspect.57 In the view of the Court:
human dignity [was] a basic and inalienable right recognized worldwide
in all democratic societies. Attached to that right is the concept of
autonomy and the right of an individual to make decisions for herself/
52. Jones v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (and The Equal Opportunity Commission,
The Trinidad and Tobago Council of Evangelical Churches, The Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha of
Trinidad and Tobago—Interested Parties), Claim No CV2017-00720, The High Court of Justice of the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, delivered 12 April 2018 (unreported) [Jones v Attorney General].
53. Sexual Offences Act, 1986, Chap 11:28, Laws of Trinidad and Tobago, s 13(2). The substantive
offence of “buggery” is in s 13(1) and carries a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment.
54. Ibid s 16(3). The substantive offence of serious indecency is in s 16(1) and carries a maximum
penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment.
55. Sexual Offences Act, supra notes 53 and 54.
56. In arriving at this view, the court applied a “generous and purposive” approach to the
interpretation of the Constitution. It relied on such cases as Attorney General v Jobe, 1984 AC 689;
Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, 1980 AC 319; Reyes v R, 2002 UKPC 11; Matthew v The State,
2004 UKPC 33; Hunter v Southman, 1984 2 SCR 145.
57. The Court relied on the Indian case Puttaswamy v Union of India, 2012 Writ Petition (Civil)
No 494, which emphasized that sexual orientation was an essential attribute of privacy, which was
“inextricably linked to human dignity” (Jones v Attorney General, supra note 52 at 29.)
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himself without any unreasonable intervention by the State...[S]he/he
must be able to make decisions as to who she/he loves, incorporates
in his/her life, who she/he wishes to live with and with whom to make
a family...A citizen should not have to live under the constant threat,
the proverbial ‘sword of Damocles’, that at any moment [he] may be
persecuted or prosecuted...58

The Court further held that the State had no reasonable justification for
this interference with the claimant’s fundamental right to private family
life. In making that determination, the Court relied on both domestic and
international jurisprudence. For instance, the Court referenced both the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Supreme Court of
Canada case R v Oakes59 and highlighted that rights and freedoms can only
be subject to “reasonable limits prescribed by law...[and] demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.”60 This is not particularly unlike
section 13(1) of the Trinidad and Tobago Republican Constitution, which
uses similar language: not “reasonably justifiable in a society that has
proper respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual.”61
The Court did not stop at Canadian jurisprudence, but also referenced
“the position in democratic societies” by alluding for example to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in such cases as Dudgeon
v United Kingdom,62 Norris v Ireland 63 and Modinos v Cyprus.64 Very
important for the purposes of this article as well, the Court also referenced
Article 17 of the ICCPR, specifically making use of the Toonen v Australia
decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in
which the Committee held that “it is undisputed that adult consensual
sexual activity in private is covered by the concept of ‘privacy’” and
continued that even if the law interfering with this right is not enforced, “[t]
he continued existence of the challenged provision…directly ‘interferes’
with the [individual’s] privacy…[A]ny interference with privacy must be
proportional to the end sought and be necessary in the circumstances of

58. Jones v Attorney General, supra note 52 at 29-30.
59. 1986 1 SCR 103; SC J No. 7.
60. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
61. It is instructive to note that in Jones v Attorney General, Rampersad J, pointed out that “the
test seems to be substantially the same between section 1 of the [Canadian] Charter and section 13
of the [Trinidad and Tobago] Constitution with the only apparent difference being a limit which is
reasonable and can be demonstrably justified, in the case of the former, as opposed to one which is
reasonably justified, in the case of the latter. To my mind, there is no material difference” (ibid at p 41).
62. 1981 4 EHRR 149.
63. 1989 13 EHRR 1862.
64. 1993 16 EHRR 6853.
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any given case….”65 This resort to international standards and norms was
explicitly acknowledged by the Court when it stated at paragraph 106 of the
judgment that “the consolidation of rights and freedoms of the individual...
is necessarily fashioned out of local experience and culture with due regard
being paid to the international norms in relation to individuals.”
The case of Orozco v Attorney General66 from Belize also dealt with
the matter of sexual intimacy involving “buggery.” The claimant in that
case challenged the constitutional validity of section 53 of the Belize
Criminal Code,67 which states that “[e]very person who has carnal
intercourse against the order of nature with any person or animal shall
be liable to imprisonment for ten years.” The basis for the claim was that
the provision interfered with the rights to human dignity, personal privacy
and privacy of the home, private life, equal protection under the law, and
further, was an abridgement of the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with privacy.68 Like the Jones court in Trinidad and
Tobago, the court in Orozco turned its eyes to international jurisprudence,
and specifically to the reasoning of the ECtHR, in holding that section 53
had violated the claimant’s right to privacy:
In Dudgeon v UK A 45 [1981] ECHR 7525/76, the European Court of
Human Rights stated the following in its judgment in a reference made
to the Court by a homosexual male in Northern Ireland:
“In the personal circumstances of the applicant, the very existence
of this legislation continuously and directly affects his private life;
either he respects the law and refrains from engaging - even in private
with consenting male partners - in prohibited sexual acts to which he
is disposed by reason of his homosexual tendencies, or he commits

65. Toonen v Australia, Communication No 488/1992, Human Rights Committee, adopted 31 March
1994, at paras 8.2-8.3.
66. Caleb Orozco v The Attorney General of Belize (and The Commonwealth Lawyers Association,
The Human Dignity Trust, The International Commission of Jurists, The Roman Catholic Church
of Belize, The Belize Church of England Corporate Body, The Belize Evangelical Association of
Churches and United Belize Advocacy Movement—Interested Parties), Claim No 668 of 2010, The
Supreme Court of Belize, delivered 10 August 2016 (unreported) [Orozco v Attorney General].
67. Criminal Code, 2000, CAP. 101.
68. The Constitution of Belize, 1981 (Rev 2011). Section 3 of the Constitution of Belize reads:
“Whereas every person in Belize is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual,
that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but
subject to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the
following, namely (a)…; (b)…; (c) protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of
his home and other property and recognition of his human dignity….” Section 6(1) reads: “All persons
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.”
Section 14(1) reads: “A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. The
private and family life, the home and the personal correspondence of every person shall be respected.”
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such acts and thereby becomes liable to criminal prosecution.”69

The Court “gratefully” adopted this position in its own analysis to establish
standing on the claimant’s part.
In Orozco, just as in Jones, the Court adopted a purposive approach70
to the constitutional provisions litigated by the claimant and embraced
the view that the Constitution was a “living instrument.” Relative to the
central role of international law, the Court remarked that the Constitution
of Belize “[owed] its provenance to the European Convention on Human
Rights [ECHR] which in turn was influenced by the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, [and] as such, decisions in relation to human rights issues
have been informed by developments in international law.”71 In further
reliance on this guidance, the Court also acknowledged that “the streams
of domestic law and international law ought to flow in the same direction
in establishing fundamental norms applicable to the rights conferred by the
Constitution.”72 This approach by the Orozco Court was a clear acceptance
of the role of core international human rights norms and values, where
domestic constitutional and human rights were being litigated in home
courts.
The right to privacy was one of the main planks of the analysis
conducted by the Orozco Court. It grounded the privacy discussion in
the notion of human dignity and called on assistance from jurisprudence
in Canada,73 South Africa74 and Europe75 on this issue. This approach
was entirely consistent with the Court’s consideration of the right to
freedom of expression as a second basis for vindicating the claimant’s
contentions. The Court considered the leading ECtHR case of Handyside
v UK, declaring that freedom of expression was “consistent with and
complementary to the diversity and difference of opinion contemplated
in the [Belize] Constitution.”76 Equality was the final arm of the Court’s
analysis, and again, international law was front and centre. The Court
adopted the reasoning of the UNHRC in the Toonen v Australia case,
which was litigated under the ICCPR. The result of course was a holding
69. Orozco v Attorney General, supra note 66 at 20.
70. In this regard, the Court placed heavy reliance on the case of Nadan and McCoskar v The State,
2005 FJHC 500, a Fijian case; and Reyes v The Queen 2002 UKPC 11.
71. Orozco v Attorney General, supra note 66 at 24.
72. Ibid at para 59.
73. Vriend v Alberta, 1998 1 SCR 493; Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
1999 1 SCR 497.
74. National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice, 1999 (1) SA 6.
75. Dudgeon v UK, 1981 ECHR 7525/76; Norris v Ireland, 1988 ECHR 105812/83; and Modinos v
Cyprus, 1993 ECHR 15070/89.
76. Orozco v Attorney General, supra note 66 at 34.
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that “the claimant had been discriminated against on the basis of sexual
orientation.”77
The generosity of the courts in Jones and Orozco was, however, not
duplicated in Tomlinson v Belize and Tomlinson v Trinidad and Tobago,78
a twin decision of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), in its original
jurisdiction.79 In this case, the claimant asserted that immigration law
provisions in both Belize and Trinidad and Tobago violated his Treaty
right to free movement within CARICOM,80 as those provisions expressly
barred homosexuals from entry into those countries, subject to certain
other provisions. In Belize, section 5 of the Immigration Act made “a
homosexual” a “prohibited immigrant,” subject to an exemption based
on the discretion of the Minister; in Trinidad and Tobago, under section
8 of the Immigration Act, entry into that country was “prohibited” to
“homosexuals,” although the Minister could allow a homosexual to
enter as a person “passing through...under guard to another country.”
Tomlinson’s contention was a simple one; the provisions, in their plain
meaning, could prevent him potentially from exercising his Treaty right
to free movement within CARICOM, in so far as Belize and Trinidad and
Tobago were concerned.
Perplexingly one might say, the Court in basic essence, relied partly
on the act of state doctrine to determine that since both states did not
actively enforce the impugned provisions, there was no violation of the
Treaty. In my view, this was an unsatisfactory use of the law, which
ultimately resulted in a missed opportunity. The approach taken by the
Court did not fairly and effectively resolve the substance of the claimant’s
contention. The provisions clearly stated that “homosexuals” were prima
77. Ibid at para 95.
78. Maurice Tomlinson v The State of Belize and Maurice Tomlinson v The State of Trinidad and
Tobago (consolidated), 2016 CCJ 1 (OJ) [Tomlinson].
79. The Caribbean Court of Justice is a regional court that has both an original jurisdiction and
an appellate jurisdiction. Under its original jurisdiction, it hears cases from Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) states that are signatories to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the
Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (RTC), which is an
international instrument governing relations between CARICOM Member States. The court’s
original jurisdiction is, therefore, mandatory on matters arising for dispute settlement under the RTC.
However, the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ is optional. CARICOM Member States subscribe to that
jurisdiction if they wish to. At this point, only four CARICOM states (Barbados, Guyana, Belize, and
Dominica) have accepted the court’s appellate jurisdiction. As recently as November 2018, Grenada
and Antigua and Barbuda held referenda on the question of joining the CCJ’s appellate Jurisdiction,
but both referenda results rejected that idea. The Tomlinson cases were both decided in the CCJ’s
original (Treaty) jurisdiction.
80. CARICOM, the Caribbean Community, was created in 1973 by the Treaty Establishing the
Caribbean Community and its annex, The Caribbean Common Market, 4 July 1973, 946 UNTS 17,
known as the Treaty of Cha-guaramas. That treaty was replaced in 2001 by the RTC (see note 79).
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facie, prohibited immigrants. The simple path for the Court ought to have
been an interpretation of the clear literal meaning of the words used in the
alleged offending sections, followed by a straightforward analysis of how,
if at all, this would impact the Treaty right of free movement.81
While Trinidad and Tobago accepted that the Immigration Act in fact
classified homosexuals as “prohibited persons,” Belize argued that only
homosexuals who received the proceeds from homosexual behaviour, just
as in the case of prostitutes, also covered in the section, were prohibited.
In other words, the section was not disjunctive as in “prostitutes,”
“homosexuals” and “any other person” living from the avails of prostitution
or homosexuality. However, this interpretation was wholly implausible,
and the Court resiled from a golden opportunity to pronounce on the
flagrant and immutable discrimination that both provisions contained.
This was a failure on the part of the Court to enforce international human
rights norms and values in a way that it was clearly entitled to do.
Even accepting that the Court in its original jurisdiction was not per
se a “human rights” court, it would have been on solid ground to employ
international human rights law and hold that the provisions in question
violated the Treaty obligations, based on Article 217(1) of the RTC, which
states that “The Court, in exercising its original jurisdiction under Article
211, shall apply such rules of international law as may be applicable.” It
is interesting to point out that in the Tomlinson decision, the Court even
accepted that:
International human rights which have crystallized into customary
international law form part of the common law of Trinidad and Tobago...
[and that] this human rights approach may be seen as being in keeping
with the Preamble of the 1976 Constitution...in its affirmation that ‘the
nation...is founded upon principles that acknowledge...the dignity of
the human person and the equal and inalienable rights with which all
members of the human family are endowed by their Creator.’ Section
4 of that Constitution...recognizes and declares fundamental human
rights and freedoms, among them the right of the individual to equality
before the law and protection of the law, and the right of the individual

81. Section 5 of the Belize Immigration Act in relevant part reads, “Subject to section 2(3), the
following persons are prohibited immigrants…(a)…(e) any prostitute or homosexual or any person
who may be living on or receiving or may have been living on or receiving the proceeds of prostitution
or homosexual behaviour…” For Trinidad and Tobago, section 8 of the Immigration Act reads in
relevant part, “Except as provided in subsection (2), entry into Trinidad and Tobago of the persons
described in this subsection, other than citizens and, subject to section 7(2), residents, is prohibited,
namely…(a)…(e) prostitutes, homosexuals or persons living on the earnings of prostitutes or
homosexuals, or persons reasonably suspected as coming to Trinidad and Tobago for these or any
other immoral purposes….”
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to respect for his private and family life.82

Notwithstanding this, however, the Court recoiled from holding that
there had been a violation on the basis that it was “[u]ltimately...in the
practical application of the legislation that...liability [was] grounded.”83
The Court also readily took a second escape chute, by explaining that a
separate Act in Trinidad and Tobago that dealt with the movement of skilled
CARCOM nationals between Member States required an immigration
officer “to permit entry...of skilled CARICOM nationals who present a
skills certificate,” “notwithstanding any other written law.”84 Suffice it to
say, Tomlinson was not contesting a refusal to grant him entry into Trinidad
and Tobago based on whether he presented a “skills certificate.” Instead,
he was contesting an immigration law that had a provision antithetical to
the actualization of a Treaty right, notwithstanding that it had never been
applied to him in his earlier visits to the countries concerned. Indeed, it
was a principled legal objection.85
Ultimately, the Court hesitated to pronounce on the interpretation of
domestic law as it was functioning in its original jurisdiction (the single
market and economy jurisdiction), and not in its appellate jurisdiction.
The Court could, however, pronounce on the interpretation of domestic
law in respect of Belize (which was subject to its appellate jurisdiction).
The Court, maybe in an effort to avoid an inconsistent ruling on the
Trinidadian situation (where that country was not subject to its appellate
jurisdiction), simply resolved the matter by digressing into a ruling that
Tomlinson had not been and was not likely to be prejudiced by the alleged
offending statutory provision. The Court resolved the case in this way
notwithstanding the fact that it knew Mr. Tomlinson’s position—having
given him permission in a preliminary antecedent proceeding to proceed
to a hearing of the case on the merits.
In the case of Godwin and Deroche v The Registrar General and
Attorney General,86 queer marriage was the touchstone issue. Both
82. Tomlinson, supra note 78 at paras 44-45.
83. Ibid at para 46.
84. Tomlinson, supra note 78 at para 49.
85. In fact, the Court pointed out in its judgment, “Tomlinson’s complaint was not based on any
factual refusal of entry or otherwise wrongful treatment by Belize or Trinidad and Tobago. Rather it
centres on the allegation that the Immigration Acts of these States prohibit the entry of homosexuals.
Tomlinson argues that the mere existence of these laws is sufficient to prejudice the enjoyment of his
Community rights” (ibid at para 3).
86. Winston Godwin and Greg Deroche v The Registrar General and The Attorney General and The
Minister of Home Affairs (and the Human Rights Commission and the Preserve Marriage Bermuda
Limited—Intervenors), 2017 SC (Bda) 36 Civ (5 May 2017) (unreported) [Godwin v Registrar
General]
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applicants had argued that Bermudian law prohibiting them from marrying
each other as gay men was a violation of the domestic Human Rights Act,
1981 (HRA). As a starting point of the Court’s core analysis, it held as a
matter of English common law,87 by which it was bound, that marriage was
an exclusive legal and emotional relationship between a man and a woman,
thereby excluding the applicants, two men. The Court then considered
section 15(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act88 which voided marriages in
which “the parties [were] not respectively male and female.” The Court
considered further gender identifiers in the Marriage Act such as “man
and wife” and “he or she” in section 23(4), in reference to the “parties
to the marriage,” or “husband” and “wife” in the same section. It then
determined that “the Marriage Act and the [Matrimonial Causes Act]...
[were] a statutory reflection of the common law impediment to same-sex
marriage.” The Court then proceeded to conduct the HRA analysis.
The Preamble to the HRA reveals its purposes as giving domestic
law effect to international human rights conventions and protecting
fundamental rights and freedoms found in the Bermuda Constitution. The
Act makes express reference to international human rights instruments, the
UDHR and the ECHR, which is a clear recognition of international human
rights norms and rules.89 The Court considered section 2(2) of the HRA,
which speaks specifically to the prohibition of discrimination based on
“sexual orientation,” among other grounds. In advancing the human rights
violation analysis, the Godwin court turned to South African jurisprudence
dealing with the ills of discrimination against queer persons in society.
The Court cited a decision of the South African courts, Minister of Home
Affairs and Another v Fourie and Another,90 and relied on an excerpt from
the judgment of Sachs, J. in that case, that:
The exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits and responsibilities
of marriage, accordingly, is not a small and tangential inconvenience
resulting from a few surviving relics of societal prejudice destined to
evaporate like the morning dew. It represents a harsh if oblique statement
by the law that same-sex couples are outsiders, and that their need for

87. Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee 918860 L.R. 1 P.&D. 130. At page 133 Lord Penzance formulated
it this way—“I conceive that marriage…for this purpose [may] be defined as the voluntary union for
life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”
88. Matrimonial Causes Act, 1974:74, Laws of Bermuda. The section reads in material part, “A
marriage…shall be void on the following grounds only, that is to say—that it is not a valid marriage
under the Marriage Act 1944; (a)…; (b)…; that the parties are not respectively male and female.”
89. It is important to note however that Bermuda is in a politically different position to the other
countries dealt with in this article, as it remains an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and not an independent State.
90. 2005 ZACC 19 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).
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affirmation and protection of their intimate relations as human beings
is somehow less than that of heterosexual couples. It reinforces the
wounding notion that they are to be treated as biological oddities, as
failed or lapsed human beings who do not fit into normal society, and,
as such, do not qualify for the full moral concern and respect that our
Constitution seeks to secure for everyone. It signifies that their capacity
for love, commitment and accepting responsibility is by definition less
worthy of regard than that of heterosexual couples.91

This conclusion was crystallized by the Godwin Court, having further held
that the registrar general was in fact providing a service in the issuance
of marriage permits and was, therefore, subject to the anti-discrimination
provisions of the HRA under section 31(1).92
In an effort to both blunt and reverse the ground-breaking consequences
and effect of the Godwin decision on Bermudian marriage laws, the
Government of Bermuda enacted the Domestic Partnership Act, 2018
(DPA).93 The critical provision was section 53, which emphatically—and
highly unusually—made express reference to the decision of the Court in
Godwin:
Clarification of the law of marriage
53. Notwithstanding anything in the Human Rights Act 1981, any other
provision of law or the judgment of the Supreme Court in Godwin and
DeRoche v The Registrar General and others delivered on 5 May 2017,
a marriage is void unless the parties are respectively male and female.
(Emphasis added.)

The challenge to section 53 came in Ferguson v The Attorney General.94
The applicant was successful in the Bermudian High Court, leading to an
appeal to the Court of Appeal of Bermuda (Attorney General v Ferguson),95
and culminating again in victory for the respondent/claimant.

91. Godwin v Registrar General, supra note 86 at 33.
92. The section provides that it applies to “…(a) an act done by a person in the course of service
of the Crown—[i] in a civil capacity in respect of the Government of Bermuda; or [ii] in a military
capacity in Bermuda; or (b) to an act done on behalf of the Crown by a statutory body, or a person
holding a statutory office, as it applies to an act done by a private person.”
93. Domestic Partnership Act, 2018:1, Laws of Bermuda.
94. Roderick Ferguson v The Attorney General (and OUTBermuda, Maryellen Jackson, Gordon
Campbell, Sylvia Hayward-Harris and The Parlor Tabernacle of the Vision Church of Bermuda v The
Attorney General), 2018 SC (Bda) 46 Civ (6 June 2018).
95. The Attorney General for Bermuda v Roderick Ferguson, OUTBermuda, Maryellen Jackson,
Gordon Campbell, Sylvia Hayward-Harris and The Parlor Tabernacle of the Vision Church of
Bermuda, Civil Appeal Nos 11 and 12 of 2018, The Court of Appeal of Bermuda, delivered 23
November 2018 (unreported) [Ferguson v Attorney General].
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At the Court of Appeal, the Court held that the revocation provision
found in section 53 of the DPA was enacted for “a mainly religious
purpose” to assuage the anti-gay marriage lobby group Preserve Marriage
Bermuda (PMB).96 This, therefore, brought the Court’s analysis squarely
to discrimination on the basis of religion and creed. In conducting its
analysis, the Court relied on human rights jurisprudence from Canada and
the United Kingdom. Relying on McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited,97 the
Court of Appeal adopted the view that:
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely
on religious grounds cannot...be justified. It is irrational...But it is also
divisive, capricious and arbitrary. We do not live in a society where all
people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion...
cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in general
law than the precepts of any other...So, the law must firmly safeguard
the right to hold and express religious belief, equally firmly, it must
eschew any protection of such belief’s content in the name only of its
religious credentials. Both principles are necessary conditions of a free
and rational regime.98

This was consistent with the Court’s application of the Supreme
Court of Canada case Mouvement Laique Quebecois v Saguenay,99 where
McLachlin C.J. explained that the obligation that resides with the state
to maintain, protect and preserve religious neutrality emerges from an
evolving interpretation of what it means to have freedom of conscience
and religion. In that connection, it behoves the state not to engage in any
way that favours or hinders its neutral role on such matters. This, the Chief
Justice explained, was a hallmark of a free and democratic society, which
places an obligation on the state to motivate citizens to engage freely in
public life irrespective of their beliefs. This accordingly enhances and
gives strength to the multicultural nature of society. So, where the state
is required to protect everyone’s freedom of religion and conscience, it
must encourage the harmonious and non-conflictual expressions of both

96. As the court pointed out,“Since 2015 opposition to same-sex marriage has been coordinated
by Preserve Marriage Bermuda (PMB), a religious lobby created to oppose same-sex marriage. It
has done so through petitions, demonstrations and court interventions as well as lobbying Members
of Parliament. Its petition, which attracted over 9,000 signatures said: ‘We agree that marriage in
Bermuda should remain defined and upheld as a special union ordained by God between a man and a
woman.’ Other similar statements appeared on its website…PMB has the right to believe but it does
not have the right to impose its beliefs on anyone else.” Ibid at para 34.
97. 2010 EWCA Civ 880.
98. McFarlane v Relate Avon, 2010 EWCA Civ 880 at paras 24-25.
99. 2015 2 SCR 3.
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believers and non-believers in public life, such that one or the other does
not become a detriment to any individual in the society.
The Bermudian Court of Appeal also applied the Canadian case of R
v Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,100 for the proposition that a law that infringed
religious freedom was inconsistent with any fundamental right that
protected such a freedom. As Dickson J noted in Big M Drug Mart:
Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and
constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom
means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the rights of others, no one is forced
to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or conscience... In my view, the
guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion prevents the government
from compelling individuals to perform or abstain from performing
otherwise harmless acts because of the religious significance of those acts
to others. The element of religious compulsion is perhaps somewhat more
difficult to perceive (especially for those whose beliefs are being enforced)
when, as here, it is nonaction rather than action that is being decreed, but
in my view, compulsion is nevertheless what it amounts to.101

In the context of Bermuda, section 8(1) of the Constitution was inexorable
to the approach of the Court:
Except with his consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of
his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this section the said
freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with
others, and both in public or in private, to manifest and propagate his
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.102

It is little wonder therefore that the Court of Appeal sought grounding
in the precedents it applied. Its logic was evidently a reflection of core
international principles. As international human rights jurisprudence
declares, while a state may possess the power to enact legislation that
limits an individual’s right to a given freedom, pursuant to the limitation
provisions of such international instruments, such limitation of any
person’s rights can only be justified when, taken together with the
protection of the rights and reputations of others, it is deemed necessary;
or to meet the requirements of national security, public safety, order,
morality or health; or for the general welfare of a democratic society. Such
limitations are also required by international principles to be prescribed by
100. 1985 1 SCR 295.
101. R v Big M Drug Mart, 1985 1 SCR 295 at paras 95 and 133.
102. Schedule 2 to the Bermuda Constitution Order, 1968, section 8(1).
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law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in democratic societies.103
Any restrictions or limitations that fall outside of these parameters are,
therefore, a violation of international law principles.
So, in the context of the reason for the DPA, as determined and
pronounced by the Court of Appeal, while the law may have been
“useful” to the objectives of PMB, or desirable to the likely majority of
the Bermudian Christian population, that did not make it “necessary” in
a democratic society. This was an opportunity at vindication for the right
of same-sex couples in Bermuda to marry, which the Court of Appeal
grasped with obvious clarity.
The final case for consideration is McEwan v Attorney General.104
This is a judgment from the CCJ, involving a group of young men who
were charged with wearing female attire in contravention of the Summary
Jurisdiction (Offences) Act.105 The appellants claimed that the provision of
the Act material to this charge was ultra vires the Constitution of Guyana.
The violations argued by the appellants were their right to equality and
non-discrimination guaranteed under Article 149 of the Constitution
and their right to freedom of expression pursuant to Article 146. They
further argued that the provision violated Articles 40 of the Constitution
(protection of the law) on account of the vagueness of the term “improper
purpose,” which made it impossible for the citizen to guide their conduct
and Article 144 (fair hearing), based on an apprehension of bias in certain
remarks by the presiding magistrate about the need for the appellants to
seek God and turn to religion to correct their behaviour.
In the lead judgment of the Court, the President offered a very poignant
and inspired rendering of the importance of recognizing and respecting
differences within societies. Holding the provision unconstitutional,
Saunders P. cut to the heart of the matter:
Difference is as natural as breathing. Infinite varieties exist of everything
under the sun. Civilised society has a duty to accommodate suitably
differences among human beings. Only in this manner can we give due

103. UNHCR Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, A/HRC/23/40 General Assembly; 17 April 2013 at
paras 28-29.
104. Quincy McEwan, Seon Clarke, Joseph Fraser, Seyon Persaud, Society Against Sexual
Orientation Discrimination (SASOD) v The Attorney General of Guyana, 2018 CCJ 30 (AJ) [McEwan
v Attorney General].
105. Laws of Guyana, Cap 8:02, s 153(1)(xlvii). The section reads—“Every person who does any
of the following acts shall, in each case, be liable to a fine of not less than seven thousand dollars…
(i)…(ii)…(xlvii) being a man, in any public way or public place, for any improper purpose, appears in
female attire, or being a woman, in any public way or public place, for an improper purpose, appears
in male attire; or (xlviii)…”

424 The Dalhousie Law Journal
respect to everyone’s humanity. No one should have his or her dignity
trampled upon, or human rights denied, merely on account of a difference,
especially one that poses no threat to public safety or public order. It is
these simple verities on which this case is premised.

In holding the provision to be a violation of the right to be protected
from discrimination and of the right to free expression, the Court adopted
the link between equality and dignity from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, quoting from the Advisory Opinion on Proposed
Amendment to the Political Constitution of Costa Rica related to
Naturalization106 where it stated that:
The notion of equality springs directly from the oneness of the human
family and is linked to the essential dignity of the individual. That
principle cannot be reconciled with the notion that a given group has the
right to privileged treatment because of its perceived superiority. It is
equally irreconcilable with that notion to characterize a group as inferior
and treat it with hostility or otherwise subject it to discrimination in the
enjoyment of rights which are accorded to others not so classified.107

The Court further relied on principles of equality and nondiscrimination from the CEDAW108 Committee,109 as well as jurisprudence
from several jurisdictions, among them, Canada,110 India111 and Belize.112
In holding a violation of the right to be free from discrimination, the Court
ruled that section 153(1)(xlvii) had a “disproportionately adverse impact
on transgendered persons…[as it] infringes on their personal autonomy
which includes both the negative right not to be subjected to unjustifiable
interference by others and the positive right to make decisions about
one’s life…[The section also] reinforces stereotyping…[and] conduces
to the stigmatization of those who do not conform to traditional gender
clothing…thus enabling the state to unleash its full might against them…
[This] cannot…be reasonably justified.”113
106. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, 19 January 1984, Series A, No 4.
107. McEwan v Attorney General, supra note 104 at para 65.
108. UN General Assembly resolution 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1249 p 13,
online: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3970.html> [https://perma.cc/8JV8-GQM9] or
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cedaw.pdf> [https://perma.cc/2VY3-LAZD]
109. General Recommendation No 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women at 22.
110. Law v Canada, 1999 1 SCR 497; R v Oakes, 1986 1 SCR 103; Andrews v Law Society of British
Columbia, 1989 1 SCR 143.
111. National Legal Services Authority v Union of India and Others, 2014 4 LRC 629; 2012 Writ
Petition (Civil) No 400.
112. Roches v Wade, 2004 Action No 132, The Supreme Court of Belize (delivered 30 April 2004).
113. McEwan v Attorney General, supra note 104 at para 72.
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In a similar vein, relative to the violation of the right to free expression,
the Court was equally resolute and unqualified it its protection of the
appellants by asserting that:
No one should have to live under the constant threat that, at any moment,
for an unconventional form of expression that poses no risk to society,
s/he may suffer such treatment. But that is the threat that exists in
section 153(1)(xlvii). It is a threat particularly aimed at persons of the
LGBTI community. The section is easily utilised as a convenient tool
to justify the harassment of such persons. Such harassment encourages
the humiliation, hate crimes, and other forms of violence persons of the
LGBTI community experience. This is at complete variance with the
aspirations and values laid out in the Guyana Constitution…114

The McEwan Court also took the opportunity to strike down section
153(1)(xlvii) of the Act, as it determined that the phrase “improper purpose”
was too vague to be constitutionally sound. This was entirely consistent
with international human rights law, which establishes that in order for
a human right to be justifiably fettered, the impediment must firstly be
one that is “prescribed by law.” A restriction is prescribed by law115 not
only if it has a basis in domestic law per se—but also it is required to be
accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effect.116 A law
is foreseeable if it is formulated with enough precision so as to enable an
individual governed by it to properly regulate their conduct.117 The Court
in Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom118 also asserts that an Act is
prescribed by law where the effects of that law are not so vague as to render
them unpredictable. Further, as determined in Pinkney v Canada,119 an Act
is prescribed by law where it contains adequate safeguards to protect the
citizen from arbitrariness. This was precisely the holding of the McEwan
court when it ruled that:
a penal statute must meet certain minimum objectives if it is to pass
muster as a valid law. It must provide fair notice to citizens of the
114. Ibid at para 79.
115. The Sunday Times v The United Kingdom, App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991);
Silver and Others v The United Kingdom, 1983 Series A no 61; Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke
Media B and others v The Netherlands, App no 39315/06 (ECtHR 22 November 2012).
116. Amann v Switzerland App no 27798/95 (ECHR, 16 February 2000) ); Liberty and Others v The
United Kingdom App no 58243/00 (ECtHR 1 July 2008); Savovi v. Bulgaria App no 7222/05 (ECtHR
27 November 2012).
117. Malone v Commissioner of Police, 2 August 1984; Kruslin v France, 1990 series A no 176 A;
Huvig v France, 1990 Series A no 176 B.
118. App No 25594/94, 25 November 1999, 2000 30 EHHR 241, ECHR 199-VIII.
119. Pinkney v Canada, Merits, Communication No 27/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/14/D/27/1977, IHRL
2845 (UNHRC 1981), 29 October 1981, Human Rights Committee [UNHRC]; Al-NAshif v Bulgaria
App no 50963/99 (ECtHR, 20 June 2002).
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prohibited conduct. It must not be vaguely worded…A law should not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement…The fact that no
one can say with certainty what an improper purpose is or what male
or female attire looks like, leaves transgendered persons in particular
in great uncertainty as to what is not allowed. And to aggravate that
injustice, it gives law enforcement officials almost unlimited discretion
in their application of the law.120

On all major counts in this case, therefore, the Court followed and enforced
international human rights law norms and rules.
IV. TWAIL and Caribbean Queer Rights Jurisprudence
From the discussion of the cases above, and the evidence provided, it
is apparent that the courts do not share the neo-colonial/anti-imperialist
narrative championed by TWAIL scholars. Nor do the courts’ decisions
reflect the anti-hegemonic rhetoric addressed by Smith & Kosobucki121
and Massad122 or the animus of the population relative to the situation in
the Cayman Islands as reflected in Vlcek’s analysis.123 To the contrary,
I would suggest that what has emerged is a passionate and decisive
embrace and adoption of globalist international human rights norms and
values, diligently and artfully brought to bear on an evolving Caribbean
articulation of queer rights.
The integration by Caribbean courts of norms and guidance from
wider international legal sources, or the jurisprudential solidarity that their
queer rights opinion canvass, does not in my view diminish the integrity
or indigeneity of the decisions in these Caribbean cases, neither does it
totally assay the creative aspirations of the courts to craft a principled
jurisprudential queer rights/human rights philosophy. Indeed, from
the evidence offered, what the courts appear to do is to build their own
framework of analysis based on the domestic constitutional and statutory
human rights provisions (as in the Human Rights Act in the case of Bermuda),
thereafter establishing the terrain for principled analysis and explication,
with reference not only to domestic and regional jurisprudence but also
to that which is extra-regional and international as well. This is an effort
to advance a new blended enunciation for the protection of human rights
(in particular, queer rights), which depicts not the usual anti-colonialist,
TWAIL-like fervour and critique of international human rights law, but is
rather an amalgamation of reasonable international human rights norms
120.
121.
122.
123.

McEwan v Attorney General, supra note 104 at paras 80 and 84.
Smith & Kosobucki, supra note 2.
Massad, supra note 3.
Vlcek, supra note 4.
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and principles, and a respect for local conditions. This is somewhat similar
to what Woessner describes as a mapping out of “a different conception
of human rights altogether, one that looks not just at the clean centres of
cosmopolitan power, but at the messier margins of provincial suffering.”124
In other words, the courts are not simply rejecting international norms on
equality, liberty and entitlement to human dignity, because of notions of
imperialism versus parochialism or “core” versus “periphery” in relation
to human rights, but are instead justifying and applying these norms in a
contextual manner, not based purely on cultural values, but on fairness, the
rule of law, and democratic values.
What this indicates is that there is a discernible judicial propensity to
construct a framework of analysis that is not symptomatic of the precepts
of the TWAIL approach, which triggers and reinforces historical and
international political economy considerations of colonial “capture,” but
rather to construct a framework that is based on pragmatism, objective
reality and fundamental notions of human equality and dignity. This is
enhanced by the courts’ domestication of these wider and more fundamental
epitaphs of the rule of law, applied to the factual circumstances and
imperatives before them. Consider, for instance, that prior to McEwan
a person in Guyana could be arrested, charged, detained in custody,
convicted and sentenced, simply for wearing a piece of clothing, more
commonly worn by the opposite sex, that a police officer determined was
for an “improper purpose.” What the Court did in that particular case was
to wield a tour de force of objection to such arbitrariness and violation
of an inherent entitlement to self-determination, thereby establishing a
“normative” expectation in the law, that was not previously in existence.
Now, while men dressing in perceived women’s clothing in public might
not have been deemed to be a culturally acceptable course of conduct
in the Caribbean prior to, or even with the McEwan decision the Court
acceded to a legally higher calling—the protection of the rights to free
expression and equality before the law that are essential to human dignity,
particularly when no issues of public safety, public indecency or public
health are implicated.
As TWAIL has it, international human rights law comes with what
Parmar refers to as “ideological and historical baggage.”125 If its concern is
124. Martin Woessner, “Provincializing Human Rights? The Heideggerian Legacy from Charles
Malik to Dipesh Chakrabarty,” in JoseI-Manuel Barreto, ed, Human Rights from a Third World
Perspective: Critique, History and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2013) at 68.
125. Pooja Parmar, “TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry,” (2008) 10:4 Intl Community L Rev 363 at
369.
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the suffering of particularly situated human beings, then, as a methodology,
the goals that it sets out to achieve “must be followed in ways that lead
to conceptualisations that enable emancipatory interpretations and not
replication of the past.”126 This objective of “emancipatory interpretation”
is what the courts seem to be embarking on, as an incremental disowning
of hegemonic-based conceptualizations of things such as “buggery” and
restrictions on marriage for example, which in the Caribbean have their
roots and philosophical underpinnings in colonial history. By taking
decisions such as those in Orozco, Ferguson and McEwan, the courts
are engaging in a discourse of emancipation. They are formulating their
own narratives of queer rights in their jurisprudence, through a process
of organic evolution, which symbolizes liberation from the proverbial
European colonial rule, rather than Eurocentric or Western imposition.
To that extent, in choosing not to uphold rules and laws that are vestiges
of this colonial era, and in safeguarding and vindicating queer rights, the
Caribbean courts themselves are embarking on an emancipatory decolonial
project.
In this context, I am, therefore, critical of the TWAIL approach to
international human rights law, bearing in mind that it represents notions
of the unactualized poignancy of domestic Third World culture in the
promulgation of international human rights norms, as well as notions of
resistance to “neo-colonial” and “imperialist” capture.127 It is my argument
that equality-seeking rights, in particular queer rights, in so far as the
Caribbean is concerned, clearly create a tension with core elements of
TWAIL. The question now becomes this: is there room for accommodation
in TWAIL of equality-seeking queer rights in the Caribbean? Or, does the
approach of the Caribbean courts ostensibly resolve the conflict with what
amounts to a decisive distancing from judicial thinking that would reflect
or image the TWAIL-like methodological approach to international human
rights norms?
But what are norms and how are they to be understood? For convenience
I borrow from Judge, et al. who explain that:
norms are “a model or standard accepted (voluntarily or involuntarily)
by society or other large group, against which society judges someone or
something.” Norms depend on community perception, acceptance, and
enforcement…[Further], norms [are] “informal social regularities that
126. Ibid at 368.
127. See Okafor & Agbakwa, “Re-Imagining,” supra note 29; Okafor, “Newness,” supra note 25;
Okafor, “International,” supra note 28; Mutua, “Metaphor,” supra note 7; Mutua, “Ideology,” supra
note 33; Anghie, “Imperialism,” supra note 38; Anghie, “Globalization,” supra note 26; Rajagopel,
“Counter-Hegemonic,” supra note 46.
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individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of
duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”’,…[T]he
term “norm” refers to “both behaviour that is normal, and behaviour that
people should mimic to avoid being punished…Thus although norms are
outside of legal rules, they are important for legal governance.”128

Against this backdrop, I advance the proposition that international
human rights norms should be the “standards of human behaviour that
are accepted and expected”; the “model or standards accepted”; the social
“regularities” that individuals should feel obligated to follow; and the
behaviours that should be “mimicked”; where human freedom, dignity
and equality or concerned. I argue that relative to the protection of human
rights, such norms should not be predicated on nuanced cultural practices
in and of themselves, without more, but should instead be viewed through
the prism of whether or not such cultural and nuanced local practices
reflect standards of human behaviour that embody freedom, equality and
dignity. In other words, the objective standard should not be determined
by a domestic majoritarian or religious view, pronouncement, or approach
to a given course of conduct; rather, it should be determined according to
whether or not enforcing such a view, pronouncement or approach, would
be offensive to or inconsistent with “regularities” of human freedom,
equality and dignity. Without this objective standard, I argue, there is
the perennial risk (as I understand the resistance and political modus of
TWAIL) that where certain Third World customs, cultures or practices are
inconsistent with what are labelled or perceived as Western/First World
international “human rights norms,” there would be some perception of
neo-colonial imposition. The case law explored in this article does not
support that TWAIL proposition, without more. Instead, what appears to
be happening is that Caribbean courts are employing external laws and
norms from the international human rights arena to evolve domestic ones.
This is not a careless or reckless imposition of such external laws and
norms, but rather, a context-driven, considered, rational and purposeful
application of such laws and norms.
In the cases of Orozco, Jones, Ferguson and Godwin, one of the most
forceful objections came from religious organizations, which essentially
argued that “buggery” and gay marriage were not culturally acceptable,
based on religious precepts that were “Caribbean norms.” Indeed, in
Ferguson, as noted above, the Court explicitly found that the government
acted out of religious motivation. In such a scenario, the question then
128. Elizabeth F Judge & Tenille E Brown, “Pokemorials: Placing Norms in Augmented Reality,”
(2017) 50 UBC L Rev 971 at 991-992.
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becomes, should these cultural/religious norms prevail over international
human rights norms of freedom, dignity and equality? The inescapable
answer in my view is a resounding no. That is precisely the view taken by
the courts in the decisions examined above.
One cannot help but underscore the irony of the “TWAILesque”
approach of these religious organizations in their claim that permitting gay
marriage and legalizing consensual “buggery” in private were offensive and
disrespecting impositions of a neo-colonial “rescue” or “capture.” These
religious/cultural norms were handed to Caribbean peoples by colonial
rulers hundreds of years ago, and actually reflected colonial values at the
time. Those former colonial “masters” have since changed their own laws
on these issues; determined enclaves of Caribbean societies still continue
to claim ownership of these antiquated laws on the basis of culture and
religion, to defend against primacies of equality and non-discrimination.
This is no different, for instance, from the irony in the perennial claim that
Commonwealth Caribbean countries should abandon Her Majesty’s Privy
Council in the United Kingdom and adopt their own final appellate court,
in order to preserve local culture and protect against foreign culture, yet,
as recent as November 2018, the populations of two Caribbean countries
(Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada), rejected the adoption of the appellate
jurisdiction of the CCJ as their final appellate court, in favour of the Privy
Council, in separate referenda.129 Symons et al. aptly capture this irony,
in their discussion on polarization in international human rights sexuality
law:
Opponents generally argue that legal treatment of sexuality should be
determined at a national level and not mandated by international human
rights instruments. Opposition is typically framed as a defense of
sovereignty that resists imposition of western cultural values and identity
categories. Ironically, strongly anti-colonialist governments in Asia,
Africa, and the Caribbean now defend laws that were often introduced
under the British colonial regime and the ‘tradition’ referred to is often
the legacy of 19th century missionary teachings…130

So, can TWAIL be reconciled in its counter-hegemonic, imperialist
political scholarly agenda, with the equality-giving queer rights
jurisprudence of the Caribbean courts as examined in this article? I argue
that there is space for accommodation based on core precepts of the rule
129. “CCJ Disappointed with referenda Results in Grenada and Antigua and Barbuda,” Caribbean
360.com (7 November 2018), online: <http://www.caribbean360.com/news/ccj-disappointed-withreferenda-decisions-in-grenada-and-antigua-barbuda> [https://perma.cc/55WH-GRVZ]
130. Jonathan Symons & Dennis Altman, “International Norm Polarization: Sexuality as a Subject of
Human Rights Protection” (2015) 7:1 International Theory 61 at 65.
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of law and democracy. It could never be fairly or seriously argued that
“TWAILers” are antithetical to these core precepts and legal propositions.
The variance comes where consideration is given to how international law
norms and values are “normalized” across the international sphere, vis-àvis domestic values and norms. The rule of law, as former United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Anan explains:
refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law,
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation
of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.131

Concomitantly, democracy contemplates “…a system of justice and
equality among people, as a process that recognizes the diversity in society
and allows constant criticism of phenomena, relationships and processes.
Democracy is at the same time both acquisition and instrument of freedom,
justice and equal opportunities in society.”132 In this connection, if the goal
of both international human rights norms and TWAILers are justice and
equality, then there cannot be much divergence, irrespective of whatever
nomenclature is used, particularly where domestic constitutions create
and enshrine these rights and norms. These domestic constitutions are
typically organic, coming out of a process of consultation and very often,
express consent through suffrage. As such, these constitutions must be
taken to be the will of the people in the given jurisdiction in which they
bear supremacy over all other laws.
In the cases discussed in this article, the various rights were anchored
primarily in constitutional instruments. All the rights litigated were as
common as rights come, namely freedom of expression, privacy, and
equality in the law, and before the law. None of these are inconsistent with
respect for democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the legitimacy offered or
ascribed by the courts in the enforcement of these rights cannot be rooted in
social preferences and idiosyncrasies that are attached to public opinions,
expectations or preferences, or socio-cultural proclivities, but ought, and
should be about the more omniscient values. As long as it is those core
131. The Secretary General, Report on The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post
Conflict Societies, UNSCOR, 2004 UN Doc S/2004/616 at para 6.
132. Milica Kastratovic, “Democracy,” (2015) 5 Intl J Economics & Law 27 at 28.
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values that are being vindicated, then there ought not to be any viable
space for divergence between equality-seeking queer-rights interests and
those who defend the TWAIL approach to international human rights
norms and values.
Conclusion
In the few years that queer rights have begun to become a feature of
Caribbean human rights jurisprudence, Caribbean courts have been able
to render a few amazing and ground-breaking decisions. From protecting
gay marriage in Bermuda, to the destruction of the criminalization of
“buggery” in Trinidad and Tobago and Belize, the earth has moved in
Caribbean human rights jurisprudence. While these decisions are confined
to domestic jurisdictions and may not have binding application across the
entire region as a result of the varying constitutional arrangements that
exist, persuasive precedents have nonetheless been set. It would be hard to
envision major divergences in other parts of the Caribbean as similar cases
are eventually brought to other Caribbean courts.
From this research, it is evident that Caribbean courts have thus far
shown a willingness to be open-minded in reaching for fairness, by heavily
engaging not only with queer rights jurisprudence and general human rights
perspectives from a variety of extra-regional jurisdictions, but also from
international bodies and institutions. This indubitably signifies a trajectory
of channelling the Caribbean stream of queer rights to flow in unison, as
far as is possible, with the stream of rights accepted and crystalized in
international human rights law. Importantly, courts in the region are not
thrusting into a realm of creative judicial activism of their own. Instead,
they appear to only be bringing, as necessary, international human rights
norms to bear on Caribbean judicial law-making where queer rights are
concerned, so that a “made in the Caribbean” outcome which prioritizes
equality and non-discrimination can be achieved.
What this tells us is that the rhetoric of counter-hegemony, resistance,
West versus East, or North versus South, championed by TWAIL approaches
to international law, are not fundamentally taking flight in Caribbean courts
so far, nor do these approaches seem to be a part of the path that these courts
are forging on queer rights. Instead, the courts are engaging persuasively
and deliberately with these “outside” principles, breathing life into basic,
core human rights norms and values that are already inherent in Caribbean
constitutional regimes and laws. Many of these constitutions, in fact, are
modelled in the images of international treaties such as the ICCPR and
the UDHR, and as such, it is not as if these rights never existed. To the
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contrary, what is unfolding is an evolving articulation of these rights in a
new discourse of queer rights in the Caribbean.
That is why, even though the approach of the courts to queer rights
has not been shown to amplify or imbibe the TWAIL methodological
perspectives, there can still be common ground between both the Caribbean
jurisprudence on queer rights and TWAIL, as both operate within constructs
that validate basic ideas of the rule of law and democracy. The rule of law
dictates that there be respect for human dignity and for equality before
the law, while democracy protects the entitlement of each individual to
enjoy the opportunities of self-determination and self-actualization as
every citizen, as long as public safety, order or morality, and public health
are preserved. That is essentially what the courts in the Caribbean have
thus far said in relation to queer rights, and that is what can also be said
to be reasonable, fair and just. It is a leap of faith, that has great potential
for Caribbean peoples, in a socio-cultural environment where fear and
misunderstanding of differences abound.

